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NOTE
TORTS-The Wisconsin Supreme Court Addresses Wrongful Pregnancy
Causes of Action. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243
(1990).
INTRODUCTION
With the rise in popularity of sterilization in the United States as a
method of contraception,' a new cause of action has developed. This cause
of action, known as wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception,2 occurs
when a female or male undergoes a sterilization procedure and the female
subsequently becomes pregnant. A healthy child is born and the female or
couple sues the physician for damages caused by the negligent sterilization,
the pregnancy, and the costs of rearing the child. Although the other dam-
ages have been routinely granted, until recently, child rea#ng damages were
generally rejected by the courts on public policy grounds.
In Marciniak v. Lundborga the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous decision, declined to follow the majority of states who reject damages
on public policy grounds by concluding that the "costs of raising the child
to the age of majority may be recovered by the parents for damages caused
by a negligently performed sterilization operation."4 Even more trendset-
ting, the court further concluded that "these costs may not be offset by any
1. The sterilization of a female is known as tubal ligation, a procedure during which the
physician blocks the fallopian tubes so that sperm is unable to unite with the egg. Sometimes,
however, the procedure fails because a channel forms in the gap in the tube, allowing sperm to
unite with the egg, or because a physician negligently misses or inadequately treats a fallopian
tube. It is the latter type of failure that results in an action for negligent sterilization. Gary I.
Strausberg, The Failed Tubal Ligation, 21 TRIAL 30, 30-31 (1985).
Sterilization of a male is known as a vasectomy, a relatively simple operation carried out under
local anesthesia. Sperm may remain stored in the seminal vesicle and prostate for several weeks
following the operation, making pregnancy possible despite the operation. Or, following the sur-
gery, the vas may rejoin, allowing the sperm to enter the urethra, unite with the egg and result in
pregnancy. John F. Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 25, 32-33 (1975).
2. "Wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful conception" should be distinguished from "wrongful
birth" and "wrongful life" causes of action. "Wrongful birth" is an action brought by parents
against a physician who negligently failed to inform them of the increased possibility that their
child would be born with birth defects. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 99 (1987). "Wrongful
life" is a claim brought on behalf of a child born with birth defects and is the child's equivalent of
parents' wrongful birth action. Id. § 100.
3. 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990).
4. Id. at 61, 450 N.W.2d at 244.
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benefits conferred upon the parents by virtue of the presence of the child in
their lives."
This Note begins with a summary of the facts of Marciniak The devel-
opment of the cause of action for wrongful pregnancy is then discussed,
followed by an evaluation of the Marciniak decision. The Note concludes
with a prediction of Marciniak's impact on future wrongful pregnancy
causes of action.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Paula Marciniak underwent a sterilization operation6 in 1981 to avoid
having additional children.7 Mrs. Marciniak testified at her deposition that
she chose surgical sterilization because she desired to get off birth control
pills and "was led to believe that the surgical procedure would be perma-
nent."' However, in 1983, Mrs. Marciniak gave birth to a healthy child.9
The Marciniaks filed a Submission of Controversy with the Wisconsin
Patients Compensation Panel; the action was then transferred to the Circuit
Court of Polk County.10 The defendants sought dismissal of the
Marciniaks' claim for recovery of the costs of rearing the child." The trial
court held that when a healthy child is born as a result of negligent steriliza-
tion, child rearing costs to the age of majority are recoverable, but that the
value of any benefits the parents receive by virtue of the presence of the
child in their lives must be subtracted from these costs. 12
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court decision,' 3 concluding
that recovery of child rearing costs was barred by the public policy consid-
5. Id.
6. Mrs. Marciniak underwent a" 'laparoscopy with bilateral fallopian tube cautery."' Mar-
ciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 62, 450 N.W.2d 243, 244 (1990).
7. At the time of the operation, the Marciniaks had two children, ages eight and seven. Mrs.
Marciniak worked 25 hours a week as a clerical aid at $4.90 per hour to assist the family finan-
cially. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. When asked at her deposition why she did not abort the unplanned child, she replied:
"'I could not kill a baby.... I am Catholic.'" As to why she did not give the child up for
adoption, she stated: "'It was my child."' Id.




13. 147 Wis. 2d 556, 433 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243
(1990).
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erations enunciated in Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. 14 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court then granted review and reversed the holding of the court of
appeals.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE WRONGFUL PREGNANCY CAUSE OF ACTION
A. General Development
The cause of action for wrongful pregnancy dates back to a 1934 Minne-
sota Supreme Court decision. In Christensen v. Thornby,5 the plaintiff un-
derwent a vasectomy after the defendant physician warned the plaintiff's
wife that she might not survive the birth of another child. 6 The plaintiff's
wife subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child.17 The
plaintiff sued for medical expenses and anxiety caused by fears for his wife's
health. 8 The court denied the plaintiff any recovery, stressing that the pur-
pose of the vasectomy was to protect the health of the plaintiff's wife and
not to prevent the expenses of pregnancy.19 The court concluded: "Instead
14. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). In Rieck, Justice Hansen, writing for a unani-
mous court, barred recovery of child rearing costs where a physician negligently failed to diagnose
Mrs. Rieck's pregnancy, thereby precluding the possiblity of an abortion. The court stated:
Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be
denied on grounds of public policy because: (1) The injury is too remote from the negli-
gence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence
should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too
unreasonable a burden (in the case before us, upon physicians and obstetricians); or (5)
because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims;
or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
(citation omitted). Any one of these public policy considerations could be sufficient to
deny recoverability. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 517-18, 219 N.W.2d at 244. The Rieck court then went on to bar recovery on grounds (2),
(5), and (6). Id. at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
The court of appeals found that "[tihe fact that Paula Marciniak sought and was the subject of
surgery eliminates the concern for fraudulent claims." Marciniak, 147 Wis. 2d at 558, 433
N.W.2d at 618. However, it also concluded that there was "no factual distinction that would
eliminate the expressed concerns in Rieck for factors (2) and (6)" and reversed the trial court's
decision granting to the Marciniaks child rearing costs. Id. at 559, 433 N.W.2d at 618.
15. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
16. Id. at 123, 255 N.W. at 621.
17. Id. at 124, 255 N.W. at 621.
18. Id. The plaintiff did not allege negligence on the part of the physician but deceit that the
surgery would be successful. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
19. Id.
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of losing his wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of an-
other child." 20
Twenty years later, a Pennsylvania court reached a similar result. In
Shaheen v. Knight,21 the plaintiff chose to have a vasectomy for family plan-
ning reasons.22 The plaintiff sued for breach of contract when his wife sub-
sequently became pregnant and gave birth to the couple's fifth child.23 Like
Christensen, the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no damages,
stating: "The only damages asked are the expenses of rearing and educat-
ing the unwanted child. We are of the opinion that to allow damages for
the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public senti-
ment of the people."' z4 Not all courts, however, agreed with this "overrid-
ing benefit theory" - that the benefit of the birth of a healthy child always
outweighs, as a matter of law, any injury to the parents - but denied child
rearing damages on other grounds.25
The first breakthrough for the wrongful pregnancy cause of action oc-
curred in 1967, when a California Court of Appeals decided Custodio v.
Bauer.26 The plaintiff was the mother who had already borne nine children
when she underwent sterilization upon her physician's advice that another
pregnancy would aggravate a bladder and kidney disorder.27 The plaintiff
sued her physicians for negligence when her tenth child was born. 8 The
20. Id., 255 N.W. at 622. It should be noted that although the Christensen court denied
recovery for negligent sterilization, it found that sterilization was not against public policy or
public morals. Id. at 125-26, 255 N.W. at 622.
21. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 45. The court continued:
To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the physician would have to pay
for the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating
of this, defendant's [sic] fifth child. Many people would be willing to support this child
were they given the right of custody and adoption, but according to plaintiff's statement,
plaintiff does not want such. He wants to have the child and wants the doctor to support
it. In our opinion, to allow such damages would be against public policy.
Id. at 45-46.
25. See, e.g., Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), where the court declined
to follow Christensen and Shaheen, but upheld the judgment for the defendant on other grounds.
Compare West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 326, 40 A.2d 610, 611 (1945), where the court
reversed a nonsuit, stating the plaintiffs "were entitled to recover for all pain and suffering, mental
and physical, together with loss of services and any other loss or damage proximately resulting
from such negligence." Id.
26. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
27. Id. at 307, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
28. Id. at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
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court quickly resolved issues of proximate cause and public policy, 29 and
focused on the damage issue with which previous courts had long struggled.
The court noted that the purpose of damages is not to compensate for the
unwanted child but to "replenish the family exchequer so that the new arri-
val will not deprive the other members of the family of what was planned as
their just share of the family income."'3 ° The court also pointed out that
even "[c]ity, state and federal agencies have instituted programs for dis-
pensing of contraceptive information with a view toward economic better-
ment of segments of the population. ' 31 The court allowed damages for
child rearing costs, noting at the same time the applicability of the "benefit
rule," which requires that damage to a particular interest be diminished by
the amount to which the same interest has been benefited by the defendant's
tortious conduct. 3
2
In Troppi v. Scarf,33 the defendant pharmacist negligently filled the
plaintiff's prescription for birth control pills with tranquilizers. 3' Like Cus-
todio, the Troppi court rejected the public policy arguments of Christensen
and Shaheen, but instead allowed child rearing damages on constitutional
grounds, noting that "[c]ontraception has been held to be within a constitu-
tionally protected 'zone of privacy' that surrounds the marital relation-
ship."'35 The Troppi court, as well, applied the "benefit rule." However, it
concluded that the value of the benefit conferred by the birth of a healthy
child should be subtracted from the plaintiffs' total recovery, rather than
being weighed against a particular interest harmed.3 6 Further, the Troppi
29. The court rejected the defendants' allegation that the injuries or damages suffered by the
plaintiffs were not the proximate result of any breach of duty on their part because of the interven-
ing sexual relations between the parents, and agreed with Christensen and Shaheen that a steriliza-
tion operation, whether motivated by either health or financial reasons, is not against public
policy. Id. at 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
30. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
31. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
32. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. The "benefit rule" originates from the RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). Section 920 provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the
extent that this is equitable.
Id.
33. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
34. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 512.
35. Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965)).
36. Id. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. b
provides a much narrower interpretation of "interest":
b. Limitation to same interest. Damages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not
diminished by showing that another interest has been benefited. Thus [for example] one
1991]
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court held that parents who seek damages for the birth of an unwanted
child have no duty to mitigate damages by aborting the fetus or placing the
child for adoption.37
B. Wrongful Pregnancy in Wisconsin
Prior to Marciniak v. Lundborg, the only Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
cision addressing child rearing damages was Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co. " Rieck, however, was not a "true" wrongful pregnancy case in that the
plaintiffs sued their obstetrician for failure to timely diagnose the preg-
nancy, thereby precluding an abortion. 9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
denied the parents' request for child rearing costs on public policy
grounds.' ° The court, agreeing with Shaheen, held that to shift the costs to
the obstetrician would "create a new category of surrogate parent, ... be
wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved,... place too unreason-
able a burden upon physicians. . . . [and] . . . enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point."41
Two years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hospital42 took a step in the direction of allowing child rearing
costs. In Dumer, the pregnant plaintiff was negligently diagnosed by the
defendants as suffering from an allergic reaction when in fact she had ru-
bella.43 When the child was born with a "rubella syndrome,"' the plaintiff
who has harmed another's reputation by defamatory statements cannot show in mitigation
of damages that the other has been financially benefited from their publication... unless
damages are claimed for harm to pecuniary interests .... Damages for pain and suffering
are not diminished by showing that the earning capacity of the plaintiff has been increased
by the defendant's act.
Id. See Joseph S. Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. Rnv.
1409, 1415-19 (1977), for in-depth discussions of the benefit rule as well as criticisms of the Troppi
application and A.N.M., Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful
Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REv. 1311, 1323-26 (1982).
37. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 257-60, 187 N.W.2d at 519-20. The court based this holding on
the tort principle that: (1) "the tortfeasor takes the injured party as he finds him"; and (2) on
reasonableness. "While the reasonableness of a plaintiff's efforts to mitigate is ordinarily to be
decided by the trier of fact, we are persuaded to rule, as a matter of law, that no mother, wed or
unwed, can reasonably be required to abort (even if legal) or place her child for adoption." Id. at
260, 187 N.W.2d at 520 (footnote omitted).
38. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
39. Id. at 516-17, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
40. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
41. Rieck, 64 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
42. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
43. Id. at 769, 233 N.W.2d at 373. Rubella, sometimes called German measles, is a mild viral
infection marked by a pink macular or spotty rash, fever and lymph node enlargement. DOR-
LAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1163 (26th ed. 1981).
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brought suit, alleging that because of the defendant's negligent misdiagnosis
and consequent failure to warn her of the possible effects of rubella on the
fetus, the child was not aborted.45 The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused
to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life,4 6 but held that the parents'
claim for expenses arising out of the congenital defects stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted.47 While the court did not need to address
whether child rearing costs were recoverable, it found that the parents were
entitled to recover damages sustained because of the child's defects.48 Thus,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court took a small step toward allowing the recov-
ery of child rearing damages by recognizing that the birth of an unwanted
child does not outweigh the burdens of parenthood as a matter of law.
III. THE MARCINIAK DECISION
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Bablitch, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Marciniak v. Lundborg4 9 held that parents may recover
the costs of rearing a child conceived subsequent to a negligent sterilization
operation.50 In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed and applied
basic principles of tort law.
The court began its discussion by noting that the general rule in Wis-
consin is that a person is liable for any consequences which follow an un-
broken sequence from a negligent act, even if unforseeable5 1 The court
then recognized the public policy bases, also cited in Rieck v. Medical Pro-
tective Co.,52 for denying recovery where the chain of causation is com-
plete.53 It then addressed the issue of whether the normal rule of recovery
44. Transplacental infection of the fetus in the first trimester may produce developmental
anomalies of the heart, eyes, brain, bone and ears, including cataracts, deafness, abnormal small-
ness of the head, and mental retardation. Id. at 1163, 1297.
45. Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d at 769, 233 N.W.2d at 374.
46. Id. at 772-73, 233 N.W.2d at 375-76. The court stated: "The infant plaintiff would have
us measure the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it
is impossible to make such a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of life with im-
pairments against the nonexistence of life itself." Id. at 773, 233 N.W.2d at 375-76 (quoting
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967)).
47. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
48. Id.
49. 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990).
50. Id. at 61, 450 N.W.2d at 244.
51. Id. at 64,450 N.W.2d at 245 (citing Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 86 Wis.
2d 1, 11, 271 N.W.2d 598, 602 (1978)).
52. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 517-18, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974).
53. Id. at 65, 450 N.W.2d at 245.
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should prevail or whether the Rieck public policy considerations should
preclude recovery of child rearing costs. 4
The court carefully addressed and rejected each public policy argument
the defendants raised. First, the court disagreed with the argument that
child rearing costs are "too speculative," stating simply that "[j]uries are
frequently called on to make far more complex damage assessments in other
tort cases."" Next, the court rejected the argument that the costs of child-
rearing would be "wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negli-
gent physician. ' 56 The court responded that "the public policy of this state
does not categorically immunize defendants from liability for forseeable
damages merely because the damages may be substantial. '57 Third, the
court disagreed that awarding damages to the parents would psychologi-
cally harm the child when he or she later learns of his or her parents' law-
suit.58 Neither did the court believe that allowing child rearing costs would
in any way "debase the sanctity of human life," noting instead that the
Marciniaks desired to enhance their child's life.59 Further, the court dis-
missed the argument that allowing these costs would shift the burden of
rearing the child to the defendant, thereby creating a new category of surro-
gate parent. The court stated that "[t]o equate the responsibility of parent-
ing with the responsibility of paying for the costs of child raising is
illogical."'  Finally, the court rejected the argument that allowing child
rearing costs would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point;
the court put its faith "in our courts and our juries to distinguish the legiti-
mate [claim] from the fraudulent." 61
Having concluded that the public policy considerations of Rieck and
other courts did not preclude the recovery of child rearing costs, the court
next addressed the issue of mitigation. It held that parents are not required
to abort the fetus or to give the child up for adoption as a means of mitigat-
54. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 65, 450 N.W.2d at 245.
55. Id. at 66, 450 N.W.2d at 245-46.
56. Id., 450 N.W.2d at 246.
57. Id.
58. The court reasoned that:
[t]he parents' suit for recovery of child rearing costs is in no reasonable sense a signal to the
child that the parents consider the child an unwanted burden. The suit is for costs of
raising the child, not to rid themselves of an unwanted child.... But the love, affection,
and emotional support they are prepared to give do not bring with them the economic
means that are also necessary to feed, clothe, educate and otherwise raise the child.
Id. at 67, 450 N.W.2d at 246.
59. Id. at 67-68, 450 N.W.2d at 246.
60. Id. at 68, 450 N.W.2d at 246.
61. Id. at 68, 450 N.W.2d at 246-47.
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ing damages.62 Rather, the court stressed that "[t]he rules requiring mitiga-
tion of damages require only that reasonable measures be taken. We do not
consider it reasonable to expect parents to essentially choose between the
child and the cause of action."63  The court concluded its public policy
analysis by distinguishing Rieck both on its facts and on the relative degree
of culpability of the defendant." The court then held that child rearing
costs were recoverable but declined to extend such costs beyond the age of
majority because "parental duty of support ordinarily ceases at the age of
majority. 65
The final issue addressed by the court was whether the "benefit rule" of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 92066 requires that recovery of
child rearing costs be offset by any benefits the parents receive by virtue of
the child's presence in their lives.67 The court discussed the two limitations
to the benefit rule: (1) that the circumstances to be considered in mitigation
of damages must benefit the same interest that was harmed; and (2) that the
benefit can offset the damage only to the extent that it is equitable.68 The
court deferred to the intent of the drafters, as well as to scholarly criticisms
of improper applications of the "benefit rule" by previous courts.69 The
court agreed with these authorities that a narrow interpretation of "inter-
est" was correct. It concluded that "[p]roperly applied.., the 'same inter-
est' rule would require that the economic damages involved in raising the
child be offset by corresponding economic benefits, and that emotional
harms be offset by emotional benefits, and so on. ' 70 However, the court
declined to apply the "benefit rule" to negligent sterilization cases using the
62. Id. at 69, 450 N.W.2d at 247. Interestingly, as supporting authority, the court wrongly
cited the "avoidable consequence doctrine" of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1)
(1979), which requires mitigation where "reasonable," as REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920 cmt. f (1979). Section 920 is the "benefit rule." Despite the incorrect citation, the court's
analysis was consistent with § 918(1).
63. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 69, 450 N.W.2d at 247 (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 70, 450 N.W.2d at 247-48. The court stated that because the plaintiff in Rieck was
already pregnant when she consulted with the physicians, the interest of the Rieck plaintiff was
the inability to terminate the pregnancy, rather than the avoidance of pregnancy as was the case in
Marciniak. The physician's negligence in Rieck was in failing to diagnose the pregnancy, but the
plaintiff did not seek another medical opinion until it was too late to abort the fetus. Further, the
Rieck defendant did not know that the plaintiff desired an abortion if pregnant, while in Marci-
niak the defendant was aware the plaintiff wanted to avoid conception. Id.
65. Id. at 71, 450 N.W.2d at 248 (citation omitted).
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 72, 450 N.W.2d at 248.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 72-73, 450 N.W.2d at 248-49. The court paid particular attention to § 920 cmt. f.
Id.
70. Id. at 73, 450 N.W.2d at 249.
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rule's second limitation - that applying the benefit rule would be inequita-
ble.71 The court concluded:
The parents made a decision not to have a child. It was precisely to
avoid that "benefit" that the parents went to the physician in the
first place.... With respect to emotional benefits, potential parents
in this situation are presumably well aware of the emotional benefits
that might accrue to them as the result of a new child in their fives.
When parents make the decision to forego this opportunity for emo-
tional enrichment, it hardly seems equitable to not only force this
benefit upon them but to tell them they must pay for it as well by
offsetting it against their proven emotional damages. With respect
to economic benefits, the same argument prevails.72
Thus, the court held that child rearing costs to the age of majority "may not
be offset by the benefits conferred upon the parents by virtue of the presence
of the child in their lives." 73
IV. ANALYSIS
In Marciniak v. Lundborg,74 the Wisconsin Supreme Court joined the
minority of jurisdictions that have addressed the child rearing damage is-
sue. While twenty-six of thirty-three states that have ruled on this issue
have allowed other damages, only six jurisdictions have allowed child rear-
ing costs.75 Further, these six states have offset damages by the benefits of
the child's presence in the parents lives.76 Only one other state, Ohio, has
awarded child rearing costs to parents with no offset. 7 7 However, the lead-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 73-74, 450 N.W.2d at 249.
73. Id. at 74, 450 N.W.2d at 249.
74. 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990).
75. David J. Burke, Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Child Rearing Damages Deserve Full
Judicial Consideration, 8 PACE L. REv. 313, 324 n.78 (1988). These states include Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan and Minnesota and Ohio. Id. For a synopsis of each
jurisdiction's leading case and holding on this issue, see id. at 340-72.
The author also discusses the strong concurrences and dissents in some cases which have
denied child rearing damages, hinting that these courts could reverse their leading cases in the
near future. Id. at 325-29.
This author notes that since the publication of the cited Comment, none of the jurisdictions
addressing the child rearing damage issue has overruled its leading case. Id.
76. Id. at 324.
77. Id. at 324, 363-64 & n.79, 351-54. The leading Ohio case is Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). However, the Bowman court did not even address the "benefit
rule." Instead, the court concluded that constitutional rights required it to allow child rearing
costs, stating:
The choice not to procreate, as part of one's right to privacy, has become (subject to cer-
tain limitations) a Constitutional guarantee. For this court to endorse a policy that makes
physicians liable for the foreseeable consequences of all negligently performed operations
[Vol. 74:575
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ing Ohio decision was based on the "Constitutional guarantee" of the right
not to procreate, rather than a finding that applying the "benefit rule" to
the tort of negligent sterilization is inequitable.7"
In reaching its decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found recent
scholarly analysis of the child rearing damage issue, especially treatment of
the issue by other courts, highly persuasive. Indeed, throughout its ap-
praisal of the defendant's public policy arguments, the court rejected each
argument with reasoning based substantially on the trend in other
jurisdictions.
The court's decision to follow the trend rejecting public policy argu-
ments strenghtened the Marciniak analysis. However, the court's rationale
was weakened by its subsequent attempt to distinguish Rieck on its facts.
The court stated:
The plaintiff in Rieck was already pregnant at the time she consulted
with the physicians .... [The interest of the parents] was not the
interest in avoiding pregnancy in the first instance, as is the case
here.
Moreover, the culpability in the present case differs from that of
Rieck. The doctor's negligence in that case consisted of failing to
diagnose pregnancy at seven weeks.... In the present case, the phy-
sicians were aware that the plaintiff was seeking consultation and
treatment for the express purpose of permanently avoiding
conception.79
The weakening effect is twofold. First, the court reduced the impact of
the reasoning behind its rejection of public policy considerations by limiting
the holding to negligent sterilization. Second, it left many unanswered
questions as to the application of the holding. For example, by distinguish-
ing Rieck, the court implied that child rearing costs will not be awarded in
cases where a physician negligently fails to diagnose pregnancy, thus pre-
cluding the parents' option of abortion. Hence, the question arises whether
the court's holding applies to other scenarios that might lead to a wrongful
pregnancy action. For example, in Troppi v. Scarf 10 the parents sued a
pharmacist for filling the mother's birth control prescription with tranquil-
except those involving sterilization would constitute an impermissible infringement of a
fundamental right.
Bowman, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499 (emphasis supplied)(citations omitted).
78. Bowman, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499. As supporting authority, the Ohio
court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 70, 450 N.W.2d at 247-48.
80. 81 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 571 (1971). For a discussion of the case see supra notes
34-38 and accompanying text.
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izers. Or, in Christensen v. Thornby8 1, the husband underwent a vasectomy
because the wife's health was in danger; a healthy child was subsequently
born with no injury to the mother. It is unclear whether the Marciniak
holdings would therefore apply where: (1) the couple chooses sterilization
to prevent medical danger to the mother, rather than for financial reasons,
and a healthy child is born with no injury to the mother;82 or (2) where the
cause of the pregnancy is something other than negligent sterilization. In
sum, while the court attempted to follow a clear trend of rejecting public
policy arguments as grounds for denying child rearing costs, its holding to
allow these damages in wrongful pregnancy actions remains open-ended.
More effective is the courts holding that the "benefit rule" should not be
applied in negligent sterilization cases,83 although it is again unclear
whether the rule is likewise inapplicable to other wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the court avoided the inconsistent
application of the Troppi court when it diminished damages by the total
value of the benefits conferred upon the parents.84 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court adopted a more consistent interpretation of the rule - that economic
damages can only be offset by economic benefits, and that emotional harms
can only be offset by emotional benefits.8"
However, instead of then employing the "benefit rule" properly, the
court concluded that it was not equitable to apply the rule in the context of
the tort of negligent sterilization. 6 While it is undetermined whether the
benefit rule is similarly inapplicable to other wrongful pregnancy causes of
action, the court's holding as to how the rule should be used if applicable
still prevails. The court based its decision not to apply the "benefit rule" on
the fact that "[ilt was precisely to avoid that 'benefit' [of a child] that the
parents went to the physician in the first place."8 7 Thus, instead of holding
that recovery of child rearing costs was mandated by "Constitutional guar-
antee[s]," 8 and relying on controversial decisions such as Roe v. Wad89 as
81. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). For a discussion of the case see supra notes 15-20
and accompanying text.
82. See, eg., Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1078-83 (D.C. 1984) (Ferren,
J., dissenting). Judge Ferren argued that child rearing damages should be awarded where the
couple chose sterilization for economic reasons but denied where sterilization is deemed medically
necessary and a healthy child is born with no injury to the mother. Id.
83. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 73-74, 450 N.W.2d at 249.
84. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
85. Marciniak, 153 Wis. 2d at 73, 450 N.W.2d at 249.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Bowman, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 41, 356 N.W.2d at 496. For a discussion of the case see supra
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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supporting authority, the court chose the more pragmatic alternative to
reach the same conclusion: equity.
CONCLUSION
Through its decision in Marciniak v. Lundborg,90 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court became the first court both to allow child rearing costs to
parents for damages caused by a negligently performed sterilization and to
conclude that because application of the "benefit rule" would be inequita-
ble, the costs may not be offset by virtue of the presence of the child in the
parents' lives. Thus, the court set precedent in the recovery of damages in
negligent sterilization cases and in the proper application of the "benefit
rule" to this tort. The Marciniak decision suggests that public policy con-
siderations have lost a foothold when it comes to denying damages in this
area of the law, although it is undetermined what future impact the decision
will have on other wrongful pregnancy causes of action.
It is as well not evident how the Marciniak decision will affect medical
care. Although the Marciniak court put much emphasis on parents' right
to decide whether to conceive a child, the decision could ultimately result in
limiting this choice as it could lead to even higher medical malpractice and
health insurance costs, and, inevitably, to the unwillingness of physicians to
perform sterilization procedures.
KRISTA MIRHOSEINI
90. 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990).
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